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Abstract 
This study examines the relations between earnings informativeness, measured by the 
earnings-return relation, and the ownership structure of 977 companies in seven East 
Asian economies. Our results are consistent with two complementary explanations. First, 
concentrated ownership and the associated pyramidal and cross-holding structures create 
agency conflicts between controlling owners and outside investors. Consequently, 
controlling owners are perceived to report accounting information for self-interested 
purposes, causing the reported earnings to lose credibility to outside investors. Second, 
concentrated ownership is associated with low earnings informativeness as ownership 
concentration prevents leakage of proprietary information about the firms’ rent-seeking 
activities, which are prevalent and profitable in East Asia.   
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1. Introduction 
Public corporations in East Asia typically have low levels of transparency and 
disclosure quality.  Some commentators and policy advisors believe that a closer 
adherence to international disclosure rules and the adoption of international accounting 
standards are essential for improving corporate transparency in the region (World Bank, 
1998).  Despite efforts to impose stricter reporting rules and standards, the general 
perception is that corporate transparency has been declining (Asian Wall Street Journal, 
November 24, 1999).  While the new accounting rules may have increased the quantity of 
accounting information, investors have reservations about the quality of the reported 
numbers.
1 Therefore, it is important for regulators and policy makers to understand the 
causes of the low quality of reported accounting information in the region.   
This paper focuses on the relations between corporate ownership structure and the 
quality of accounting information in seven East Asian economies excluding Japan. More 
specifically, we use the informativeness of accounting earnings to investors as a measure 
of the quality of accounting information. We develop two complementary arguments 
pertaining to the relations between ownership structure and earnings informativeness.   
The first argument is related to the entrenchment effect of ownership concentration 
(Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1988).  Corporate ownership is highly concentrated in East 
Asia. As the controlling owners are entrenched by their effective control of the firms, 
their decisions that deprive the rights of minority shareholders are often uncontestable in 
the weak legal systems in the region and by ineffective corporate governance 
                                                           
1 This view of low information quality was shared among business professionals at the recent 
World Bank Meeting.  For example, a local lawyer from Thailand remarked that “the major difference (in                                                                                  - 3 -   
mechanisms such as boards of directors and the market for corporate control (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997; La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999a; Johnson et al., 2000b).  
Moreover, due to the complicated pyramidal and cross-holding ownership structures 
typical in East Asian companies, a significant number of controlling owners in the region 
actually possess more control than their equity ownership indicates, which further 
exacerbates the entrenchment effect.
2  The entrenchment effect of the ownership structure 
potentially affects firms’ financial reporting.  Because the controlling owner oversees the 
accounting reporting policies and is perceived to have strong opportunistic incentives to 
hold up minority shareholders, the market expects that the owner will not report high-
quality accounting information. This market perception will reduce the credibility of 
accounting earnings reports and consequently the informativeness of those earnings. 
The second argument is related to proprietary information and specific human 
capital.  By concentrating ownership, decision rights can be given to individuals who 
possess specific knowledge (Jensen and Meckling, 1992; Christie, Joye, and Watts, 1993).  
One benefit of co-locating decision rights with specific knowledge is that the leakage of 
the specific knowledge to competitors is prevented and the transferring cost of the 
specific knowledge is avoided. This benefit is great in East Asia where political lobbying 
activities are common and lucrative.  As concentrating ownership limits information 
flows to the public, political rent-seekers are able to avoid potential competition and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
accounting disclosure) between the past and today is that statements of accounts now carry more 
qualifications, not better information.”  See the report by Henny Sender (1999). 
2  Claessens et al. (2001) report that the concentrated control and the divergence between 
ownership and control in public corporations in eight East Asian economies diminish firm value, indicating 
the economic significance of the agency problem associated with ownership structures.  Consistent 
evidence is also found in several other studies.  La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999b) examine 
over 300 firms from 27 wealthy economies and report that firms with higher ownership by controlling 
owners have higher valuation.  Johnson et al. (2000a) document that levels of shareholder protection 
explain the extent of stock market decline in many emerging markets during the Asian Financial Crisis.                                                                                   - 4 -   
social sanctions.  Thus, this information effect argument predicts that concentrated 
ownership is associated with opacity and low informativeness of accounting earnings. 
Our empirical evidence is broadly consistent with the predictions of the 
entrenchment and information effects arguments.  We find that earnings informativeness, 
measured by the earnings-return relation, is significantly negatively related to the 
ultimate owner’s control level, conditional on the owner having gained effective control.  
This evidence is consistent with the information effect.  We also find that earnings 
informativeness is significantly negatively related to the degree of divergence between 
the ultimate owner’s control and the equity ownership level. This lends support to the 
entrenchment effect argument.  The result is also consistent with the information effect 
argument, provided that controlling owners who want to protect proprietary information 
use stock pyramids or cross-shareholdings to leverage their control, thus creating 
divergence between ownership and control.  These empirical results are robust to controls 
for firm size, market-to-book assets, leverage, the number of industry segments operated 
by the firm and to varying the starting and ending dates of the stock return window.  
This analysis of East Asian corporations allows us to study the subject of earnings 
informativeness in a different ownership context from that of the research on U.S. 
corporations.  Our research results are also rich in policy implications.  In general, our 
results support Ball, Kothari, and Robin (2000) by finding that policy makers should 
consider a country’s overall institutional environment before prescribing a comprehensive 
set of rules and regulations for corporate reporting. Also, it is important for policy makers 
and regulators to understand how the concentrated share ownership structure in East Asia 
is associated with incentives for firms to reduce accounting information quality.  Blindly                                                                                  - 5 -   
adopting international accounting standards and disclosure rules without regard to the 
institutional environment in East Asia will not improve the corporate transparency in this 
region. Lastly, the paper illustrates that it would be fruitful for future research to focus on 
how ownership structures shape accounting policies in emerging markets and transition 
economies. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  In Section 2, we discuss the causes and effects of 
ownership structures in East Asia and develop our hypothesis on the relation between 
ownership structure and earnings informativeness.  In Section 3, we describe our sample 
and data, report statistics on the ownership structures of East Asian firms, and present our 
empirical analyses. We conclude this paper in Section 4. 
 
2.  Development of Hypothesis 
The ownership of listed companies in East Asia is typically concentrated in the 
hands of large shareholders. This concentrated control is achieved through complicated 
ownership arrangements, i.e., stock pyramids and cross-shareholdings.
3  In this section, 
we discuss the forces that shape the ownership structure.  We then discuss how the 
ownership structure shapes the firms’ agency problems, through its entrenchment and 
incentive alignment effects on controlling owners. We finally discuss the entrenchment 
and the information arguments, which lead to a hypothesis pertaining to the relation 
between ownership structure and earnings informativeness. 
2.1. Causes of concentrated ownership 
                                                           
3Dual-class shares are rare in East Asia.  Among the seven economies that we investigate, only 
South Korea allows dual-class listings. They are completely prohibited in Hong Kong and Singapore.  The 
remaining economies prohibit dual-class shares, but allow certain preferred shares to have dual-class 
characteristics.  See Nenova (1999).                                                                                  - 6 -   
The body of property rights literature provides a general framework for analyzing 
the determinants of corporate share ownership structures.
4  The literature emphasizes the 
roles of customs, social norms, and law and legal systems in shaping the structure of 
property rights and their governance systems. Corporate share ownership can be viewed 
as a property rights arrangement through which the owner of the share is entitled to three 
categories of property rights.  First, the owner has the decision right of deploying 
corporate assets, i.e., the control or voting right.  Second, the owner has the right to earn 
income, i.e., the cash flow right.  And third, the owner has the right to transfer the share 
and the associated control and cash flow rights to another party.  The value of the share 
depends on how well its property rights are enforced. The enforcement of property rights 
is usually undertaken by both individual owners and the state.  In economies where the 
state does not effectively enforce property rights, the enforcement by individual owners 
plays a relatively more important role.  The structure of share ownership affects the 
degree to which corporate contracts are enforced, because it affects the owners’ abilities 
and incentives to enforce the property rights delineated by the contracts.  
One prediction from the property rights framework is that concentrated ownership 
will be observed in economies where property rights are not well enforced by the state. 
Controlling owners obtain the power (through high voting rights) and the incentives 
(through high cash flow rights) to negotiate and enforce corporate contracts with various 
stakeholders, including minority shareholders, managers, laborers, material suppliers, 
customers, debtholders, and governments.  The various parties in the nexus of corporate 
                                                           
4  The literature was pioneered by Coase (1960), Demsetz (1964), Alchian (1965, 1977), and 
Cheung (1970, 1983).  Interested readers are referred to Eggertsson (1990) for a survey of the literature.                                                                                  - 7 -   
contracts share the benefits of trade as a result.
5   Shleifer and Vishny (1997) elaborate on 
this point and suggest that the benefits from concentrated ownership are relatively larger 
in countries that are generally less developed, where property rights are not well defined 
and/or protected by judicial systems.  To test this proposition, La Porta, Lopez-De-
Silanes, and Shleifer (1999a) investigate the ownership concentration by the three largest 
shareholders of the largest corporations in countries around the world and find that weak 
legal and institutional environments (laws and enforcement) are associated with the 
highly concentrated share ownership of listed companies. The private enforcement of 
property rights is a probable reason for the concentrated ownership of East Asian 
corporations, which often confront weak legal systems, poor law enforcement, and 
corruption.   
2.2. Incentive effects of ownership concentration 
 
The degree of ownership concentration affects the nature of contracting, creating 
agency problems between managers and outside shareholders.  When ownership is 
diffuse as is typical in the U.S. and the U.K., agency problems stem from the conflicts of 
interest between outside shareholders and managers who own an insignificant amount of 
equity in the firm (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Roe, 1994).  On 
the other hand, when ownership is concentrated to a level at which an owner obtains 
effective control of the firm, as is the case in East Asia and most other locations outside 
                                                           
5 Large owners can be beneficial in diffusely held firms, too.  The existence of large owners 
mitigates the free-rider problem associated with the diffuse ownership structure in monitoring managers.  
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) provide evidence that ownership concentration in the U.S. is positively related to 
the control potential of firms, among other factors.  They argue that distortions in the market for corporate 
control along with the managerial labor market increase the control potential of shareholders, which leads 
to increases in ownership concentration.  Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that large shareholders monitor 
managers, which in turn increases firm value.  This argument is supported by U.S. evidence (Holderness 
and Sheehan, 1988; Barclay and Holderness, 1989). 
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the U.S. and the U.K., the nature of the agency problem shifts away from manager-
shareholder conflicts to conflicts between the controlling owner (who is also the 
manager) and minority shareholders. 
2.2.1. The entrenchment effect 
Gaining effective control of a corporation enables the controlling owner to 
determine how profits are shared among shareholders.  Although the minority 
shareholders are entitled to the cash flow rights corresponding to their share investments, 
they face the uncertainty that the entrenched controlling owner may opportunistically 
deprive them of their rights.  The effects of entrenchment by the controlling shareholder 
include outright expropriation, i.e., the controlling shareholder benefits from self-dealing 
transactions in which profits are transferred to other companies he/she controls.
6  The 
controlling shareholder can also exercise de facto expropriation through the pursuit of 
objectives that are not profit-maximizing in return for personal utilities. The 
entrenchment problem created by the controlling owner is similar to the managerial 
entrenchment problem discussed by Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988).  Increasing 
managerial ownership may entrench managers, as they are increasingly less subject to 
governance by boards of directors and to discipline by the market for corporate control. 
2.2.2. The alignment effect 
One way to mitigate the problem of controlling owner entrenchment is to increase 
further the controlling shareholder’s ownership stake, or even to go private if the problem 
is sufficiently severe.  A higher ownership stake gives a controlling owner stronger 
                                                           
6Scott (1999) studies the role of corporate governance in four Asian countries that were in 
financial crisis: Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea and Thailand.  He concludes by recommending that 
strengthening the effective limits on self-dealing transactions of controlling owners would be the priority 
task for these countries.                                                                                  - 9 -   
voting and cash flow rights in the firm. Once the controlling owner obtains effective 
control of the firm, any increase in voting rights does not further entrench the controlling 
owner, but his/her higher cash flow rights in the firm mean that it will cost more to divert 
the firm’s cash flows for private gain.  The high ownership concentration can also serve 
as a credible commitment that the controlling owner is willing to build a reputation for 
not expropriating minority shareholders (Gomes, 2000).  The commitment is credible 
because minority shareholders know that if the controlling owner unexpectedly extracts 
high levels of private benefits when he/she still holds a substantial amount of shares, they 
will discount the stock price accordingly, and the majority owner’s share value will be 
reduced.  In equilibrium, the majority shareholder will hold a large ownership stake and 
the stock price of the company will be higher.  Thus, ownership concentration has an 
incentive alignment effect: increasing an owner’s share ownership beyond the minimum 
level needed for effective control improves the alignment of interests between the 
controlling owner and the minority shareholders and reduces the effects of entrenchment. 
2.2.3. Entrenchment effect when control exceeds ownership 
In addition to the characteristic concentrated ownership, the ownership 
arrangements of East Asian corporations are further complicated by pyramidal and cross-
holding structures.  These ownership arrangements allow controlling owners to commit 
low equity investment while maintaining tight control of the firm, creating a separation in 
control (voting rights) and ownership (cash flow rights).
7  One consequence of the 
                                                           
7 Separation between cash flow and voting rights is common among public corporations around 
the world (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999a).  In the context of diffuse ownership, Stulz 
(1988) suggests that there exist various contractual arrangements that allow managers to increase their 
voting power to a degree beyond their equity ownership.  Such arrangements may lead to changes in capital 
structures or differential voting rights, which in turn provide managers more control than what they are 
entitled to by their equity ownership.  What causes the separation between voting and cash flow rights is a 
subject not adequately addressed in the literature.  It is potentially related to both controlling owners’                                                                                  - 10 -   
divergence between voting and cash flow rights is that the controlling owner becomes 
entrenched with high levels of control, while the low equity ownership level provides 
only a low degree of alignment between the controlling owner and minority 
shareholders.
8  A controlling owner in this situation could extract wealth from the firm, 
receive the entire benefit, but only bear a fraction of the cost.  We offer a simple 
pyramidal structure to illustrate this point.  An entrepreneur owns 25% of the stock in 
publicly traded Firm A, which in turn owns 32% of the stock in Firm B.  In the most 
modest scenario, we note that the entrepreneur controls 25% of Firm B -- the weakest 
link in the chain of voting rights.  At the same time, the entrepreneur owns about 8% of 
the cash flow rights of Firm B, the product of the two ownership stakes along the chain. 
Given this ownership structure, it costs the entrepreneur only eight dollars for every 100 
dollars expropriated from Firm B.  Clearly, if stock pyramids or cross-shareholdings were 
used to consolidate control, they would also result in a separation between ownership and 
control, which exacerbates the entrenchment problem of controlling owners. 
In summary, once controlling owners achieve effective control, their ownership 
concentration has two incentive effects on them: entrenchment and alignment. When 
there is no separation between voting and cash flow rights, concentrating ownership 
beyond the minimum level for effective control enhances the alignment of interest and 
hence mitigates the entrenchment effect.  When the voting rights and cash flow rights 
                                                                                                                                                                             
financing constraints and their desires to maintain control. Owners may not have sufficient personal wealth 
or loans to finance the investment projects that they desire to control.  With limited amounts of cash, 
owners could leverage their control by way of stock pyramids or cross-shareholdings.  The ownership 
arrangements, which help in the formation of business groups, also allow the controlling owners to create 
internal capital and factor markets and hence to bypass underdeveloped external markets. 
8 Controlling owner entrenchment as an agency cost of the separation of cash flow rights from 
voting rights plays a key role in the theoretical models of Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1997, 1998), 
Bebchuk, Kraakman, and Triantis (2000), and Wolfenzon (1999).                                                                                     - 11 -   
diverge, however, the lower cash flow rights may fail to provide sufficient incentive 
alignment to curtail the entrenchment effect. 
2.3. Ownership structure and earnings informativeness 
  We now discuss the relations between ownership structure and earnings 
informativeness in East Asia.  We provide two potential arguments that may explain the 
relations.  The first argument is based on the entrenchment effect discussed above.  The 
second argument is related to the firms’ proprietary information and specific human 
capital effect, which will be detailed below. 
2.3.1. The entrenchment argument 
Just as the share ownership structure delineates a firm’s agency problem, it also 
impacts the firm’s reporting.  When an owner effectively controls a firm, he/she also 
controls the production of the firm’s accounting information and reporting policies.   
When the controlling owner is entrenched by his/her voting power and there is a large 
separation of the voting and cash flow rights, the credibility of the accounting 
information is reduced. That is, outside investors pay less attention to the reported 
accounting numbers, because they expect that the controlling owner reports accounting 
information out of self-interest rather than as a reflection of the firm’s true underlying 
economic transactions.  In particular, outside investors may not trust the firm’s reported 
earnings because the controlling owner may manipulate earnings for outright 
expropriation.  In addition, outside investors know that the controlling owner has an 
incentive to avoid reporting accounting information that would attract close monitoring 
by outside shareholders.  This does not always mean that there is outright earnings 
manipulation to cover up possible earnings effects of wealth extraction. The controlling                                                                                  - 12 -   
owner may simply bury the wealth effects of his/her expropriation activities in the 
aggregate earnings numbers without reporting them as separate income statement items.  
The loss of credibility in earnings reports lowers the stock price informativeness of the 
earnings. Prior studies have noted the importance of the effects of earnings credibility.  
Teoh and Wong (1993) report that the market perception of the quality of accounting 
earnings, as proxied by the size of the firm’s auditor, positively affects the stock price 
informativeness of earnings. 
2.3.2. The information argument 
Concentrating ownership allows firms to limit their information disclosure to the 
public.  Opacity is a good strategy because it prevents leakage of proprietary information 
to competitors and allows firms to avoid unwanted political or social scrutiny.  Firms 
with proprietary knowledge and specific human capital tend to concentrate their 
ownership and decision rights in the individuals who possess the specific knowledge 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1992; Christie, Joye, and Watts, 1993).  Assigning control to 
individuals without specific knowledge can lead to suboptimal decisions or a high cost of 
transferring knowledge to necessary individuals.  Moreover, if firms with proprietary 
knowledge give more individuals decision rights, they also have to give those individuals 
the proprietary knowledge to allow them to make informed decisions.  The larger the set 
of informed individuals, the larger the likelihood that the proprietary information leaks to 
the public and potential competitors.  This scenario is common among firms that engage 
in political rent-seeking activities, which are prevalent and highly profitable in East 
Asia.
9   Morck (1996) argues that there are two reasons why closely held firms are better 
                                                           
9 Fisman (1999) conducted an event study on the stock price effects of the news announcements of 
Suharto's illness.  He analyzed the value drops in the firms connected to Suharto and reported that the                                                                                  - 13 -   
able to engage in political lobbying than widely held firms. First, the concentrated 
decision rights within the firms allow them to operate in greater secrecy. A politician may 
desire more secrecy in order to maintain a reputation of integrity. The firms also prefer 
operating in secret in order to discourage entry by competitors. Second, compared to a 
hired manager in a widely held firm, a controlling owner is more secure in his position in 
the firm and thus has more credibility on which to trade favors with the government.  In 
order to trade favors with politicians and bureaucrats in secret, firms generally have 
highly concentrated ownership that allows them to have tight control of information 
flows to the public, which in turn reduces corporate transparency. In this business 
environment, it is in the interest of both the controlling owners and the minority 
shareholders to release as little accounting information to the public as possible. This 
information effect argument suggests that high ownership concentration is associated 
with low earnings informativeness. 
2.3.3. Predicted relations 
From our earlier analysis, increasing controlling owners’ equity ownership 
beyond the minimum level needed for effective control creates incentive alignment 
effects that curtail entrenchment effects, which in turn increase earnings informativeness.  
On the other hand, the information argument suggests a negative relation between 
ownership concentration and earnings informativeness.  As the incentive alignment and 
the information effects could coexist, the relation between ownership concentration and 
earnings informativeness is ambiguous and needs to be addressed empirically. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
proportion of these firms' share values attributed to Suharto connections was very large -- about a quarter of 
each firm's share value.  Political connections were valued by investors in this case.                                                                                  - 14 -   
 To account for the incentive alignment and the information effects of ownership 
concentration, we control for the level of voting rights in each firm and focus on 
examining how earnings informativeness is affected by the controlling owner’s 
entrenchment.  Using the degree of divergence between voting and cash flow rights as a 
proxy for controlling owner entrenchment, we expect that the credibility of the firm’s 
accounting information and consequently the informativeness of this information to 
outside investors decreases with an increase in the degree to which the level of voting 
rights exceeds the associated level of cash flow rights.  We acknowledge that even when 
we control for the voting right level, our divergence measure may still reflect the 
information effect.  That is, controlling owners who have proprietary information to 
protect may use stock pyramids and cross-shareholdings to leverage their control 
concentration and the divergence of these rights may tend to increase in proportion to the 
firms’ opacity.  Finding a negative relation between earnings informativeness and the 
level of divergence between the two rights, although consistent with the entrenchment 
argument, is also consistent with the information argument.  Formally, our hypothesis is: 
For a given level of voting rights, an increase in the divergence between the controlling 
owner’s degree of cash flow rights and voting rights decreases the informativeness of the 
firm’s earnings. 
 
3. Empirical  analysis 
In this section, we describe the sample, data sources, and the ownership structures 
of the sample firms.  We then test the hypothesis developed in the previous section by                                                                                  - 15 -   
analyzing the relations between the corporate ownership structure and earnings 
informativeness. 
 
3.1. Sample and data 
We select our sample firms from seven East Asian economies -- Hong Kong, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand.  We include firms 
that have sufficient ownership, stock returns, earnings and other financial data for 
empirical analysis.  Below is a description of the sample and data sources. 
3.1.1. Ownership data 
Most prior studies of ownership structures focus on immediate ownership - 
common shares directly owned by individuals or institutions.  Immediate ownership is 
not sufficient for characterizing the ownership and control structure of East Asian firms, 
as these firms are generally associated with complicated indirect ownership.  As a 
departure from these prior studies, we focus on ultimate ownership.  We use data 
assembled by Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000), which identifies the ultimate owners 
of 2,980 firms in nine East Asian economies, along with their shares of cash flow and 
voting rights.  The procedure of identifying ultimate owners is similar to the one used in 
La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999a).  An ultimate owner is defined as the 
shareholder who has the determining voting rights of the company and who is not 
controlled by anybody else.  If a company does not have an ultimate owner, it is 
classified as widely held.  To economize on the data collection task, the ultimate owner’s 
voting right level is set at 50% and not traced any further once that level exceeds 50%. 
Although a company can have more than one ultimate owner, we focus on the largest                                                                                  - 16 -   
ultimate owner.  As our definition of ownership relies on both cash flow and voting 
control rights, the cash flow rights that support the control by ultimate owners are further 
identified. Firm-specific information on pyramid structures and cross-holdings are used to 
make the distinction between cash flow and voting rights.  To facilitate the measurement 
of the separation of cash flow and voting rights, the maximum cash flow rights level 
associated with any ultimate owner is also set at 50%. However, there is no minimum 
cutoff level for cash flow rights. 
From the 2,980 firms, we exclude 1,240 Japanese firms from our analysis because 
Japan’s institutional environment and its firms’ ownership structures are quite different 
from the other East Asian economies.
10  We further exclude 319 firms whose largest 
ultimate owners have less than 20% of voting rights.  This restriction allows us to focus 
on firms with controlling shareholders and is expected to increase the power of our test 
since the entrenchment and information arguments are more applicable to ultimate 
owners that have already secured effective control.  La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and 
Shleifer (1999a) also use the 20% cutoff level to define control.  Bradley and Kim (1985) 
report that tender offers rarely occur in firms with control at the 20% level.   
 
3.1.2. Stock return and financial data 
We merge the ownership data with the PACAP electronic database, which is 
commercially distributed by the University of Rhode Island. PACAP contains the 
financial and stock return data of publicly traded companies of the seven East Asian 
                                                           
10 Different from the East Asian firms that are typically family controlled, the dominant ultimate 
owners of Japanese firms are institutions, typically the main banks of industrial groups.  Japanese firms’ 
ownership structures are also quite different from those of the East Asian firms in both the degree of control 
and cash-vote divergence.                                                                                  - 17 -   
economies analyzed here.  We select 1991 through 1995 as the period of analysis and 
retrieve the stock return and financial data for that period.  An exception is Korea, for 
which we have data up to 1994 only.  We do not include 1996 because the data are not 
available to us for that year.  We also exclude pre-1991 data because we are concerned 
that the ownership structures earlier than 1991 may differ too much from the structures 
documented in 1996.  Although we have ownership data for the Philippines, we do not 
include firms from that country because they are not covered by the PACAP database.  
The merging of the 1996 ownership data and the 1991-1995 stock return and financial 
data requires us to assume that the ownership and control structures of the firms did not 
change substantially during that period.  This is a reasonable assumption since the 
economic and political conditions were relatively stable at the time. The final sample has 
977 firms with a total of 3,572 firm-years.
11 
 
3.2. Basic statistics of ownership structures 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the cash flow and voting rights of the 
largest ultimate owners of the final sample. Broken down by economies, the sample 
covers 282 Hong Kong firms, 91 Indonesian firms, 177 Malaysian firms, 133 
Singaporean firms, 95 South Korean firms, 66 Taiwanese firms, and 133 Thai firms.  The 
sample covers 30% of all publicly traded firms in the region.
12  Panel A of the Table 
shows that the mean voting rights of the East Asian corporations is 30.44%.  In a quarter 
of the East Asian companies, more than 40% of the voting rights are in the hands of the 
                                                           
11 The two extreme percentiles of firm-year observations of annual stock returns and net earnings 
over market value of equity (see section 3.3 for the two variable definitions) are eliminated from the sample. 
12 As of December 1996, the numbers of listed firms in these economies were: 583 in Hong Kong, 
267 in Indonesia, 760 in Korea, 621 in Malaysia, 266 in Singapore, 382 in Taiwan, and 454 in Thailand.                                                                                  - 18 -   
largest ultimate owner.  Thai firms display the most concentrated voting rights, 36.32% 
on average, followed by Indonesian firms (34.51%), Malaysian firms (30.73%), Hong 
Kong firms (29.68%), Singaporean firms (28.95%), South Korean firms (26.11%), and 
Taiwanese firms (24.70%). The high control concentration is not surprising, given the 
20% voting rights restriction imposed on the sample.  However, the control concentration 
remains high when the restriction is relaxed.  Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) 
employ a lower minimum voting rights cutoff, 5% (instead of 20%), and report that the 
mean voting rights of the seven economies range from 35.25% (Thailand) to 17.78% 
(South Korea). 
Panel B reports the basic statistics for levels of cash flow rights.  The cash flow 
rights patterns are similar to the voting rights patterns in Panel A.  The overall average 
concentration is 25.84%.  Note particularly that the mean levels of cash flow rights are 
lower than the corresponding levels for voting rights in Panel A, indicating the 
divergence between cash flow and voting rights.  In Panel C, we report the basic statistics 
of the ratio of cash flow rights over voting rights (CV).  The ratio, by definition, ranges 
between zero and one.  If a firm is widely held, i.e., it has zero cash flow and voting 
rights, its CV ratio is set to one.  The CV ratio indicates the degree of divergence between 
cash flow and voting rights.  The closer the ratio is to zero, the larger the divergence.  In 
East Asia, the mean CV ratio is 0.85.  The mean CV ratios are rather similar across the 
seven East Asian economies, ranging between 0.77 (Indonesia) and 0.95 (Thailand).   
Over a quarter of the East Asian firms display cash-vote divergence (CV<1).  The 
minimum CV ratio is 0.13. The Pearson correlation coefficient between the voting rights 
and CV is only -0.07, suggesting that CV is not simply a proxy for voting rights.                                                                                  - 19 -   
The actual degree of ownership concentration in East Asia should be higher than 
the statistics reported here for several reasons. First, the 50% ceiling for the ownership 
data and the inability to trace some hidden control chains would bias our statistics 
downward. In addition, small firms tend to have more concentrated ownership, but our 
sample mainly consists of larger firms due to the limited availability of ownership data of 
small firms. However, we expect that the understatement of ownership data and the large 
firm bias in our sample would weaken but not systematically bias the data in favor of our 
hypothesis. Notwithstanding the data limitation, it is sufficient to conclude from Table 1 
that the typical ownership and control structure of the East Asian firms is highly 
concentrated, in contrast to the diffuse ownership in the U.S., as documented in prior 
research. The East Asian firms also differ from U.S. firms in that they are characterized 
by a separation of ownership and control resulting from the controlling owner’s 
possession of more voting power than cash investment. 
  
3.3. Regression analysis 
  We next perform regression analysis to examine the relations between corporate 
ownership structure and earnings informativeness in East Asia.   
3.3.1. Basic relations between returns and earnings 
Before we focus on the role of the ownership structure, we perform a set of ordinary 
least squares regressions to determine the basic relations between stock returns and 
earnings in East Asia: 
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CARit = a0 + a1 NIit + (Fixed effects) + uit 
 
where, for sample firm i, 
CARit = the cumulative net-of-market twelve-month stock returns at year t; 
NIit = the net earnings at year t divided by the market value of equity at the beginning of 
year t; 
Fixed effects = dummy variables controlling for fixed effects of calendar years and/or  
economies; 
uit = error term at year t. 
 
The regressions are performed year by year, economy by economy, and pooling all of the 
years and economies.  The results are reported in Table 2. Because we generally find 
heteroskedasticity problems in the regressions, we report White-adjusted t-statistics for 
all the coefficients.  Fixed-effects of calendar years and/or economies, where appropriate, 
are included as dummy intercepts in the regressions. For simplicity, they are not reported 
in the table. The estimated coefficients of earnings (NI) are positive and statistically 
significant across all the years and economies, suggesting that earnings have an 
information role in East Asia.  
3.3.2. The effects of ownership structure 
We next test the informativeness of earnings conditional on ownership structure 
using the following pooled time-series cross-sectional regression model: 
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CARit = a0 + a1 NIit + a2 NIit SIZEit + a3 NIit Qit + a4 NIit LEVit + a5 NIit SEGi  
             + a6 NIit Vi + a7 NIit CVi + (Fixed effects) + uit 
 
where, for sample firm i, 
CARit = the cumulative net-of-market twelve-month stock returns at year t; 
NIit = the net earnings at year t divided by the market value of equity at the beginning of 
year t; 
SIZEit = the natural logarithm of the market value of equity in millions of U.S. dollars at 
the beginning of year t; 
Qit = the market value of equity divided by the book value of total assets at the beginning 
of year t; 
LEVit = the total liability divided by total assets at the beginning of year t; 
SEGi = the number of industry segment(s) in which the firm operates; 
Vi = the voting rights level of the largest ultimate owner; 
CVi = the ratio of cash flow rights over voting rights of the largest ultimate owner; 
Fixed effects = dummy variables controlling for fixed effects of calendar years and 
economies; 
uit = error term at year t. 
 
  We include the market value of equity to the book value of total assets ratio to 
control for the effects of growth on the earnings-return relation.
13 Growth opportunities 
are likely to be positively associated with future earnings levels and/or earnings 
                                                           
13  The use of the market-to-book value of equity produces qualitatively similar results in our 
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persistence (Collins and Kothari, 1989). The higher the market-to-book assets, the larger 
the expected earnings growth and/or earnings persistence, the stronger the earnings-return 
relation.
14 On the other hand, the market-to-book ratio may also be affected by firm risk.  
High growth firms may be more risky, which weakens the earnings-return relation. Also, 
fast growing firms are likely to be young firms with less informative earnings. Given 
these countervailing effects, the net effect of growth on the earnings-return relation is 
therefore an empirical issue.  We also incorporate leverage in the regression. Leverage 
could be a proxy for the riskiness of debt or default risk (Dhaliwal, Lee, and Fargher, 
1991). Highly levered firms are associated with high risk and hence their earnings-return 
relation is weakened.  On the other hand, Smith and Watts (1992) suggest that leverage 
can proxy for a firm’s investment opportunity set. Mature firms with low growth 
opportunities generally have high leverage and are likely to have informative earnings. 
Hence firms with high leverage may have higher earnings-return sensitivity than firms 
with low leverage. Taking the risk and the growth effects together, the net effect of 
leverage on the earnings-return relation is to be determined empirically.  In addition, we 
include the number of industry segments in which each sample firm operates as another 
control. Conglomerate firms, due to their relatively more complex earnings-generating 
process, may have weaker earnings-return relations than firms operating in a single 
industry.
15 Finally, we include firm size as a control for other missing factors that affect 
the earnings-return relation. For example, prior literature on the U.S. case (Atiase, 1985; 
Freeman, 1987) has documented that public disclosure and private development of non-
                                                           
14 We do not include a separate control for earnings persistence because the earnings history is 
inadequate for its empirical estimation in our sample.   
15  The 1996 company segment data were collected from Worldscope and supplemented with 
additional data from the Asian Company Handbook. Since companies report their segment data with                                                                                  - 23 -   
earnings information are increasing functions of firm size. We employ the ordinary least 
squares method to regress CAR on voting rights level (V), the degree of separation 
between cash flow and voting rights (CV), and the control variables.
16  
  The summary statistics of the dependent and independent variables of the 
regression are reported in Table 3. These statistics generally show that the values of the 
regression variables are statistically well distributed.  The regression results are presented 
in Equation (1) of Table 4. We report White-adjusted t-statistics for all the coefficients 
due to heteroskedasticity. For simplicity, we omit reporting fixed-effects of calendar 
years and economies. Larger firms’ earnings are more informative, as indicated by the 
significantly positive estimated coefficient of NI*SIZE.  The coefficient of NI*Q is 
insignificant, suggesting that the risk and the growth effects are offset by each other.  The 
estimated coefficient of NI*LEV is significantly positive, consistent with the view that 
highly levered firms tend to be mature firms that have more informative earnings. The 
coefficient of NI*SEG is significantly negative, suggesting that conglomerate firms 
report less informative earnings than more focused firms. The coefficient of NI is 
insignificantly negative.  It does not suggest that earnings are uninformative because the 
simple regressions in Table 2 show that stock returns are significantly positively 
associated with earnings. Their relation becomes insignificant in Equation (1) because the 
inclusion of the additional independent variables may have controlled for most of the 
variation of NI and lowered its explanatory power. The intercept remains significantly 
negative as in the regression results in Table 2. The negative intercept could be caused by 
                                                                                                                                                                             
different degrees of detail, the companies’ segments are grouped according to the two-digit Standard 
Industry Classification system.                                                                                   - 24 -   
the omitted expected earnings component.  When we include lagged earnings as expected 
earnings by replacing NI with the change in earnings (current year earnings minus lagged 
earnings all divided by the lagged market value of equity) in the regression, the 
magnitude of the intercept drops by more than half. 
  The focus of Table 4 is the role of the ownership structure. The result in Equation 
(1) shows that the estimated coefficient of NI*V is negative and statistically significant at 
the 5% level. This result is consistent with the information effect that high voting rights 
are associated with secrecy and low earnings informativeness.  The result also suggests 
that the information effect dominates the incentive alignment effect, which predicts that 
additional ownership concentration beyond the minimum level of effective control 
increases earnings informativeness.  To gain understanding of the economic importance 
of the result, we use the estimated regression of Equation (1), set all of the independent 
variables at their mean, and then estimate how much CAR would change given that V 
increases by a magnitude of one standard deviation.  We find that when V increases from 
its mean, 30%, by one standard deviation to 40%, the level of CAR decreases by 1%, 
representing a 9% change relative to its previous level. 
We now turn to investigate the effect of separation of cash flow and voting rights 
on earnings informativeness. CV, by definition, is inversely related to cash-vote 
divergence.  To be consistent with the entrenchment effect and/or the information effect, 
we should observe a significantly positive estimated coefficient of CV.  Consistent with 
our conjecture, the coefficient of CV is positive and statistically significant at the 1% 
level.  In terms of economic significance, when all of the independent variables are set at 
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operates because firms in different economies are associated with different levels of ultimate voting control                                                                                  - 25 -   
their mean, decreasing CV from its mean (85%) by one standard deviation to 63% is 
associated with a 1% decrease in the level of CAR, representing an 11% drop relative to 
its previous level.
17 
  In summary, when ultimate owners effectively control their firms, their voting 
rights levels are negatively related to the informativeness of the firms’ reported earnings.  
This suggests that the information effect dominates the incentive alignment effect.  We 
also find evidence supporting our hypothesis that after controlling for the level of voting 
rights, cash-vote divergence significantly weakens earnings informativeness. This 
evidence is consistent with the entrenchment effect.  However, the result is also 
consistent with the information effect, provided that controlling owners tend to employ 
pyramidal or cross-holding ownership structures to protect the information about their 
rent-seeking activities.   
3.3.3. Checks of robustness   
Since all voting and cash flow rights that exceed 50% are capped, the effects of 
any variation in voting and cash flow rights of these firms would not be captured by our 
measure. Moreover, if actual voting and cash flow rights both exceed 50%, their 
divergence would not be captured by the CV measure, as it would be recorded as one, 
which indicates no divergence. As a sensitivity test of any possible bias in our results, we 
rerun the regression by excluding observations associated with voting rights equal to or 
more than 50% from the full sample. As reported in Equation (2) of Table 4, the sign of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
and the results are qualitatively similar. For simplicity, we report only the results with the unadjusted V. 
17  We have also run the same regression by including firms with the largest ultimate owners 
having less than 20% voting rights. The results support our hypothesis that firms with a larger separation 
between their cash flow and voting rights have less informative earnings. Consistent with our conjecture 
that the information and entrenchment effects are weaker among firms without owners commanding 
effective control, the magnitude (t-statistics) of the coefficients of NI*V and NI*CV in this regression has 
(have) dropped from –1.2 to –0.60 (–2.47 to –1.43) and 0.69 to 0.47 (3.49 to 2.46), respectively.                                                                                  - 26 -   
the coefficient of NI*V becomes statistically insignificant. On the other hand, the sign, 
magnitude, and significance level of the coefficient of NI*CV remains qualitatively 
similar to results in Equation (1). We thus confirm that the 50% ceiling for our ownership 
data would not have biased the results in favor of our hypothesis.  
  As further diagnostic checks
18, we have estimated the regression models using 
cumulative abnormal returns calculated from two fixed annual windows: nine (six) 
months prior to and three (six) months after the current fiscal year end. We have also 
used cumulative raw returns, instead of net-of-market returns, and used the two-year 
cumulative net-of-market returns, starting 21 months before to three months after the 
fiscal year-end, as an alternative dependent variable.  The two-year returns, which include 
both current and lagged-year returns, attempt to adjust for any differences in price 
efficiency in capturing future earnings between highly concentrated (high V) and less 
concentrated ownership (low V) firms (Jacobson and Aaker, 1993; Ali and Hwang, 2000). 
In addition, instead of using NI in our regression model, we have also used ∆ NI, change 
in earnings (current earnings minus lagged earnings all divided by lagged market value of 
equity). Our results for V and CV remain qualitatively similar after using ∆ NI or these 
alternative measurements of CAR.  
We provide a further test of whether or not the effects of voting control and cash-
vote divergence on East Asian firms cluster in time and/or economies. Table 5 presents 
the results of a set of year-by-year regressions.  These regressions include NI*V and 
NI*CV, in addition to the control variables.  We find that the coefficients of NI*V and 
NI*CV are mostly of the expected signs, and NI*CV is statistically significant in 1991 to 
1994, while NI*V is significant in 1991 and 1994.  Table 6 presents the results of a set of                                                                                  - 27 -   
economy-by-economy regressions using the same model.  We find ownership effects in 
several economies.  The effect of V on earnings informativeness is negative and 
significant in Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Taiwan.  The effect of CV is positive and 
significant in Hong Kong, Malaysia, Taiwan and Thailand. From the year-by-year and 
economy-by-economy results, we find that the effects of the ownership variables are not 
concentrated in any given year or economy.  
The above diagnostic checks have demonstrated that our empirical results are 
robust to the measurement bias in the ownership variables and to the various 
specifications of cumulative stock returns and earnings. In addition, the ownership effects 
are generally found in our sample, not just in any single year or economy. 
    
4. Conclusion 
  The Asian Financial Crisis has caused East Asian economies to re-examine the 
adequacy of their corporate financial reporting. Despite efforts to improve corporate 
transparency by imposing new accounting and disclosure rules in East Asia, the 
perception is that the financial reporting quality of corporations remains low. 
  We hypothesize that the high ownership concentration and the large separation of 
ownership and control, which are common in East Asia, weaken the informativeness of 
reported earnings to outside investors.  We provide two explanations for this relation.  
The first explanation is based on the controlling owners’ entrenchment.  The earnings 
credibility is weakened because minority shareholders anticipate that the ownership 
structure gives the controlling owners both the ability and incentive to manipulate 
earnings for outright expropriation or to report uninformative earnings to avoid detection 
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of their expropriation activities.  The second explanation is related to proprietary 
information.  As rent-seeking activities are prevalent and highly profitable in this region, 
it is in the best interest of rent-seekers to concentrate ownership and decision rights, so 
that the specific knowledge about their activities can be concealed from potential 
competitors and the public.  This information effect argument predicts that high 
ownership concentration is associated with low earnings informativeness. 
Our empirical results are generally consistent with the entrenchment and the 
information effect arguments. Our results are robust to controls for firm size, market-to-
book assets, leverage, number of industry segments operated by the firm, and to various 
specifications of earnings and stock returns.  
This paper makes several contributions.  First, it provides an analysis that contrasts 
with those in prior research focusing on U.S. and U.K. corporations. The prior research 
documents that an increase in managerial ownership  (Warfield, Wild, and Wild, 1995) or 
institutional ownership (Rajgopal, Venkatachalam, and Jiambalvo, 1999) would reduce 
the principal-agent problem between managers and shareholders, which would in turn 
lower the incentives and opportunities for managers to control earnings while raising the 
price informativeness of earnings. However, this relation between share ownership and 
accounting information is not applicable to East Asian corporations due to differences in 
the degree of ownership concentration and in the associated type of agency problems.  
Also, compared with the results from this body of research, our results are more 
generalizable to other parts of the world because concentrated corporate ownership in 
East Asia as compared to diffuse corporate ownership in the U.S. and the U.K. is a more 
representative corporate share structure throughout the world.  Second, several recent                                                                                  - 29 -   
accounting studies (Ball, Kothari, and Robin, 2000; Ball, Robin, and Wu, 1999; and Ali 
and Hwang, 2000) have provided evidence that in addition to accounting standards, 
features of the institutional environment such as corporate governance as well as legal 
and financial systems can also explain the differences in the properties of accounting 
information across countries.  We extend their work by examining ownership structure as 
one of the channels through which a country’s institutional environment influences each 
individual firm’s reporting quality. Third, this research may have implications for East 
Asian economic reformers and regulators who are striving to improve corporate 
governance and transparency in their countries.                                                                                  - 30 -   
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Table 1  
Cash flow and voting rights of the largest ultimate owners of East Asian corporations
a  
  Firm No.  Mean  Std. Err.  1
st Quartile Median  3
rd Quartile Minimum  Maximum 
          
Panel A: Voting rights (%) 
Hong  Kong  282  29.68 10.91 20.00 30.00 40.00 20.00 50.00
 
Indonesia  91  34.51  9.92  30.00 30.00 40.00 20.00 50.00 
Malaysia  177  30.73 10.17 20.00 30.00 40.00 20.00 50.00 
Singapore  133  28.95  9.40  20.00 30.00 40.00 20.00 50.00 
South  Korea  95  26.11  7.48  20.00 20.00 30.00 20.00 50.00 
Taiwan  66  24.70  7.49  20.00 20.00 30.00 20.00 50.00 
Thailand  133  36.32 11.18 30.00 40.00 50.00 20.00 50.00 
          
East Asia  977
  30.44 10.53 20.00 30.00 40.00 20.00
b  50.00
c 
          
Panel B: Cash flow rights (%) 
Hong Kong  282  25.60  11.19  20.00  20.00  30.00  3.00  50.00 
Indonesia 91  26.08  10.81  18.00  25.00  32.00  4.00  50.00 
Malaysia 177  26.03  11.45  20.00  22.00  30.00  5.00  50.00 
Singapore 133  22.96  10.48  16.00  20.00  30.00  6.00  50.00 
South Korea   95  21.36  8.16  18.00  20.00  30.00  4.00  50.00 
Taiwan  66  21.46 8.76 16.00  20.00  24.00 8.00 50.00 
Thailand 133  34.23  11.68  24.00  30.00  40.00  4.00  50.00 
          
East Asia  977  25.84  11.37  20.00  21.00  30.00  3.00
  50.00
c 
          
Panel C: The ratio of cash flow rights over voting rights
d 
Hong  Kong  282 0.87 0.22 0.80 1.00 1.00 0.13 1.00 
Indonesia  91  0.77 0.24 0.60 0.80 1.00 0.13 1.00 
Malaysia  177 0.84 0.22 0.70 1.00 1.00 0.17 1.00 
Singapore  133 0.78 0.22 0.60 0.80 1.00 0.27 1.00 
South  Korea  95  0.83 0.25 0.60 1.00 1.00 0.13 1.00 
Taiwan  66  0.86 0.17 0.73 1.00 1.00 0.40 1.00 
Thailand  133 0.95 0.16 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.20 1.00 
          
East  Asia  977 0.85 0.22 0.70 1.00 1.00 0.13 1.00 
          
Sample: The sample consists of  977 firms from Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, 
and Thailand.  To be included in the sample, a firm must have at least one year of stock returns and financial data from 
the PACAP database between 1991 and 1995, its ultimate ownership data must be available from Claessens, Djankov, 
and Lang (2000), and its largest ultimate owner must have at least 20% of voting rights. 
aAn ultimate owner is defined as an owner that is not controlled by anybody else. Although a firm can have more than 
one ultimate owner, only the one with the largest voting rights is reported.   
bSample firms are restricted to have a largest ultimate owner with at least 20% voting rights.  
cThe voting rights and cash flow rights level of an ultimate owner is set at 50% and not traced any further once that 
level exceeds 50%.  
dThe ratio of cash flow rights over voting rights is defined as the level of cash flows rights divided by the level of 
voting rights. The value of this ratio ranges from zero to one.    
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Table 2 
Simple regressions of stock returns on earnings
a 
 
 Intercept  NI  Adjusted  R
2  Number of 
observations
 
      
1991 -0.23***  1.26***  0.15  652
 
 (-6.90)
b  (6.19)    
      
1992 -0.05  0.76***  0.04  727 
 (-1.39)  (3.77)     
      
1993 -0.25***  1.09***  0.10  784 
 (-8.19)  (6.08)     
      
1994 -0.25***  1.06***  0.17  817 
 (-12.12)  (7.51)     
      
1995 -0.14***  0.76***  0.11  772 
 (-8.25)  (6.20)     
      
Hong Kong  -0.17***  0.73***  0.10  1045 
 (-6.57)  (7.36)     
      
Indonesia -0.07  0.73***  0.06  259 
 (-1.26)  (3.85)     
      
Malaysia -0.12***  0.80***  0.04  684 
 (-4.52)  (3.25)     
      
Singapore -0.04  0.64***  0.07  561 
 (-1.58)  (2.89)     
      
South Korea   -0.00  1.67***  0.16  346 
 (-0.08)  (6.62)     
      
Taiwan 0.14***  1.65**  0.23  311 
 (3.87)  (2.56)     
      
Thailand -0.13***  2.62***  0.17  546 
 (-3.16)  (7.99)     
      
Pooled -0.18***  0.99***  0.08  3752
 
 (-10.79)  (13.01)     
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Table 2 (continued) 
Model specification: CARit = a0 + a1NIit + (Fixed effects) + uit 
Variable definitions: CARit = the cumulative net-of-market twelve-month stock returns for firm i at year t. 
The annual returns are continuously compounded from monthly stock returns starting from twelve months 
before the latest date, as required by law or listing rules, that the firm discloses its annual report.  NIit = the 
net earnings at year t divided by the market value of equity at the beginning of year t for firm i.   
Sample: The sample includes 3,752 firm-year observations, spanning between 1991 and 1995 and covering 
977 firms from Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand.  To be 
included in the sample, a firm must have at least one year of stock returns and financial data from the 
PACAP database between 1991 and 1995, its ultimate ownership data must be available from Claessens, 
Djankov, and Lang (2000), and its largest ultimate owner must have at least 20% of voting rights. 
Observations with largest and smallest 1% values of CAR and NI are excluded from the sample.   
aSimple OLS regressions of annual stock returns on earnings are run year by year, economy by economy and 
pooling across years and economies (pooled). Fixed-effects of calendar years and/or economies are included 
for each regression when appropriate, but not reported. 
bWhite-adjusted t-statistics are in parentheses. 
*** Indicates significant at 1% (2-tailed). 
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Table 3 
Summary statistics of regression variables
 
 
Variables Mean Std.  Err.  1
st Quartile  Median  3
rd Quartile  Minimum  Maximum
               
CAR (%)  -1.12  33.46  -23.35  -6.96  14.02  -62.53  147.49 
NI  (%) 7.27  8.32  3.53  6.31  10.40 45.20 461.7 
SIZE 12.03  1.37 11.07  11.99 12.87 7.13  17.05 
Q  1.09  0.95 0.41  0.83 1.47  0.02  7.98 
LEV (%)  46.83  23.57  28.52  44.16  62.59  0.08  259.95 
SEG  2.55  1.61 1.00  2.00 4.00  1.00  9.00 
V  (%) 29.93  10.37  20.00  30.00  40.00 20.00 50.00 
CV    0.85  0.22 0.70  1.00 1.00  0.13  1.00 
             
Variable definitions: CAR = the cumulative net-of-market twelve-month stock returns. The annual returns are 
continuously compounded from monthly stock returns starting from twelve months before the latest date, as 
required by law or listing rules, that the firm discloses its annual report.  NI = the net earnings divided by the 
market value of equity at the beginning of the year.  SIZE = the natural logarithm of the market value of equity in 
millions of U.S. dollar at the beginning of the year.  Q = the market value of equity divided by the book value of 
total assets at the beginning of the year.  LEV = the total liability divided by total assets at the beginning of the 
year.  SEG = the number of industry segment(s).  V = the voting rights level of the largest ultimate owner. CV = 
the ratio of cash flow rights over voting rights of the largest ultimate owner. 
Sample: The sample includes 3,752 firm-year observations, spanning between 1991 and 1995 and covering 977 
firms from Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand.  To be included in 
the sample, a firm must have at least one year of stock returns and financial data from the PACAP database 
between 1991 and 1995, its ultimate ownership data must be available from Claessens, Djankov, and Lang 
(2000), and its largest ultimate owner must have at least 20% of voting rights.  Observations with largest and 
smallest 1% values of CAR and NI are excluded from the sample.                                                                                   - 38 -   
 
Table 4 







    
Intercept -0.18***  -0.17*** 
 (-10.39)
d  (-9.09) 
    
NI -0.59  -0.99* 
 (-1.17)  (-1.79) 
    
NI*SIZE 0.10***  0.12*** 
 (2.67)  (2.89) 
    
NI*Q -0.00  -0.03 
 (-0.05)  (-0.34) 
    
NI*LEV 1.03***  0.99*** 
 (4.09)  (3.71) 
    
NI*SEG -0.09***  -0.11*** 
 (-2.71)  (-2.83) 
    
NI*V -1.20**  -0.21 
 (-2.47)  (-0.29) 
    
NI*CV 0.69***  0.74*** 
 (3.49)  (3.44) 
    
Adjusted R
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Table 4 (continued) 
Model specification: CARit = a0 + a1NIit + a2NIit*SIZEit + a3NIit*Qit + a4NIit*LEVit + a5NIit*SEGi + a6NIit*Vi + 
a7NIit*CVi + (Fixed effects) + uit 
Variable definitions: CARit = the cumulative net-of-market twelve-month stock returns for firm i at year t. The 
annual returns are continuously compounded from monthly stock returns starting from twelve months before the 
latest date, as required by law or listing rules, that the firm discloses its annual report.  NIit = the net earnings at year 
t divided by the market value of equity at the beginning of year t for firm i.  SIZEit = the natural logarithm of the 
market value of equity in millions of U.S. dollar at the beginning of year t for firm i. Qit = the market value of 
equity divided by the book value of total assets at the beginning of year t for firm i. LEVit = the total liability 
divided by total assets at the beginning of year t for firm i. SEGi = the number of industry segment(s) of firm i. Vi = 
the voting rights level of the largest ultimate owner of firm i. CVi = the ratio of cash flow rights over voting rights 
of the largest ultimate owner of firm i. 
Sample: The sample includes 3,752 firm-year observations, spanning between 1991 and 1995 and covering 977 
firms from Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand.  To be included in the 
sample, a firm must have at least one year of stock returns and financial data from the PACAP database between 
1991 and 1995, its ultimate ownership data must be available from Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000), and its 
largest ultimate owner must have at least 20% of voting rights.  Observations with largest and smallest 1% values of 
CAR and NI are excluded from the sample. 
aTwo OLS regressions are run pooling across years and economies. Fixed-effects of calendar years and economies 
are included in the regressions but not reported.  
bEquation (1) uses the final sample that excludes observations with V<20%.   
cEquation (2) uses the sub-sample that excludes both V<20% and V>=50%.     
dWhite-adjusted t-statistics are in parentheses. 
*** Indicates significant at 1% (2-tailed). 
 **  Indicates significant at 5% (2-tailed).    
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Table 5  
Year-by-year regressions with interactions for corporate ownership structure
a 
 
  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
       
Intercept -0.26***  -0.01  -0.27***  -0.25***  -0.13*** 
 (-7.51)
b  (-0.28) (-8.35)  (-10.97)  (-6.34) 
       
NI -1.28  1.25  -2.61**  0.24  -0.45 
  (-1.03) (1.05) (-2.08) (0.23) (-0.48) 
       
NI*SIZE 0.29***  -0.18*  0.33***  -0.01  0.03 
  (3.39) (-1.94) (3.61) (-0.12) (0.38) 
       
NI*Q -0.32  -0.13  -0.22  0.26*  0.34* 
 (-1.43)  (-0.61)  (-1.22)  (1.79)  (1.80) 
       
NI*LEV 0.44  1.46**  -0.10  1.54***  2.03*** 
 (1.09)  (2.13)  (-0.19)  (3.42)  (4.70) 
       
NI*SEG -0.14*  -0.06  -0.12*  0.04  -0.11* 
  (-1.87) (-0.67) (-1.77) (0.55) (-1.84) 
       
NI*V -3.14***  0.07  -0.85  -2.30**  0.05 
 (-3.26)  (0.06)  (-0.76)  (-2.42)  (0.06) 
       
NI*CV 0.99**  1.13**  0.88*  0.77*  -0.01 
  (2.17) (2.19) (1.89) (1.82) (-0.03) 
       
Adjusted R















Model specification: CARit = a0 + a1NIit + a2NIit*SIZEit + a3NIit*Qit + a4NIit*LEVit + a5NIit*SEGi + a6NIit*Vi + 
a7NIit*CVi + (Fixed effects) + uit 
Variable definitions: CARit = the cumulative net-of-market twelve-month stock returns for firm i at year t. The 
annual returns are continuously compounded from monthly stock returns starting from twelve months before the 
latest date, as required by law or listing rules, that the firm discloses its annual report.  NIit = the net earnings at year t
divided by the market value of equity at the beginning of year t for firm i.  SIZEit = the natural logarithm of the 
market value of equity in millions of U.S. dollar at the beginning of year t for firm i. Qit = the market value of equity 
divided by the book value of total assets at the beginning of year t for firm i. LEVit = the total liability divided by 
total assets at the beginning of year t for firm i. SEGi = the number of industry segment(s) of firm i. Vi = the voting 
rights level of the largest ultimate owner of firm i. CVi = the ratio of cash flow rights over voting rights of the largest 
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Table 5 (continued) 
Sample: The sample includes 3,752 firm-year observations, spanning between 1991 and 1995 and covering 977 firms 
from Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand.  To be included in the 
sample, a firm must have at least one year of stock returns and financial data from the PACAP database between 
1991 and 1995, its ultimate ownership data must be available from Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000), and its 
largest ultimate owner must have at least 20% of voting rights.  Observations with largest and smallest 1% values of 
CAR and NI are excluded from the sample. 
aOLS regressions are run separately for each of the sample year from 1991-1995. Fixed-effects of economies are 
included in the regressions but not reported.  
bWhite-adjusted t-statistics are in parentheses.  
*** Indicates significant at 1% (2-tailed). 
 **  Indicates significant at 5% (2-tailed). 
  *   Indicates significant at 10% (2-tailed).                                                                                         - 42 -   
Table 6           
Economy-by-economy regressions with interactions for corporate ownership structure
a 
 
  Hong Kong  Indonesia  Malaysia  Singapore  South Korea   Taiwan  Thailand 
Intercept -0.19***  -0.13**  -0.10***  -0.04  0.00 0.17***  -0.17*** 
 (-7.00)
b  (-1.96) (-3.49) (-1.39) (0.08)  (5.13) (-3.95) 
         
NI -0.93  -0.65  5.50***  1.36  7.12***  11.83**  -7.33*** 
  (-1.15)  (-0.62) (2.77) (0.74) (2.80) (2.35) (-3.10) 
         
NI*SIZE 0.14*** 0.13 -0.38***  -0.09  -0.10  -0.40 0.36** 
  (2.61)  (1.35) (-2.61) (-0.68) (-0.59) (-1.18) (2.05) 
         
NI*Q  0.19  0.41 -0.56*** 0.03 -2.82***  -1.85***  0.66** 
  (1.46) (0.86) (-2.58) (0.13) (-2.82) (-3.71) (2.21) 
         
NI*LEV  0.44 0.67 -0.08 0.49  -3.13**  -5.01**  4.65*** 
  (1.31) (0.96) (-0.16) (0.73) (-2.46) (-2.15) (4.24) 
         
NI*SEG -0.03 0.14 -0.02 -0.14  -0.41**  -0.42 0.00 
  (-0.72) (1.51) (-0.21) (-1.50) (-2.48) (-1.55) (0.01) 
         
NI*V  -1.57*** -1.70  -2.75*  1.83  -3.40 -12.77** -1.20 
  (-2.60) (-1.37) (-1.70) (1.02) (-1.08) (-2.28) (-0.67) 
         
NI*CV 0.45*  0.16  1.48**  -0.07  0.38  4.73**  2.99** 
  (1.65) (0.35) (2.17) (-0.11) (0.47) (2.33) (2.31) 
         
Adjusted R
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Table 6 (continued) 
Model specification: CARit = a0 + a1NIit + a2NIit*SIZEit + a3NIit*Qit + a4NIit*LEVit + a5NIit*SEGi + a6NIit*Vi + a7NIit*CVi + (Fixed effects) + uit 
Variable definitions: CARit = the cumulative net-of-market twelve-month stock returns for firm i at year t. The annual returns are continuously compounded 
from monthly stock returns starting from twelve months before the latest date, as required by law or listing rules, that the firm discloses its annual report.  NIit = 
the net earnings at year t divided by the market value of equity at the beginning of year t for firm i.  SIZEit = the natural logarithm of the market value of equity 
in millions of U.S. dollar at the beginning of year t for firm i. Qit = the market value of equity divided by the book value of total assets at the beginning of year t
for firm i. LEVit = the total liability divided by total assets at the beginning of year t for firm i. SEGi = the number of industry segment(s) of firm i. Vi = the 
voting rights level of the largest ultimate owner of firm i. CVi = the ratio of cash flow rights over voting rights of the largest ultimate owner of firm i. 
Sample: The sample includes 3,752 firm-year observations, spanning between 1991 and 1995 and covering 977 firms from Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand.  To be included in the sample, a firm must have at least one year of stock returns and financial data from the 
PACAP database between 1991 and 1995, its ultimate ownership data must be available from Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000), and its largest ultimate 
owner must have at least 20% of voting rights.  Observations with largest and smallest 1% values of CAR and NI are excluded from the sample. 
aOLS regressions are run separately for each of the seven economies. Fixed-effects of calendar years are included in the regressions but not reported.     
bWhite-adjusted t-statistics are in parentheses.   
*** Indicates significant at 1% (2-tailed). 
 **  Indicates significant at 5% (2-tailed). 
  *   Indicates significant at 10% (2-tailed).        
         
 